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Abstract At times when the market demands strong active innovation, large industrial
corporations with established R&D organizations benefit from screening and developing
breakthrough innovation. The ability of established organizations to absorb for future
technologies is a key to successfully recognize, explore and capture breakthrough inno-
vations. R&D Venturing is a practical way of bringing about technology transfer and
exploration of future technologies through R&D cooperation, which is described in this
paper by a multiple case study in the energy sector. Existing literature has been reviewed
and an R&D Venturing concept will be suggested with a number of propositions for
implementation. The results of the case study strongly support that different perspectives of
the concept from industry, academia and the ventures themselves have to be carefully
understood. Based on the results of the case study, a conceptual framework and proposi-
tions for a successful implementation have been derived. A critical discussion of the R&D
Venturing concept shows the need for further empirical investigation.
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1 Motivation
Continuous growth in the world’s economy and population, global warming, dwindling
resources and high energy consumption—these are challenging our energy supply systems
and raising complex questions which need to be answered through technology and
innovation.
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Even the European Union’s 2020 targets of achieving a 20% renewable energy share
and a 20% reduction in CO2 will require the energy and transportation industries to rethink
their current approach to innovation. Aggressive demands for energy savings and an aging
power supply infrastructure demand real breakthrough innovation and radical improve-
ments to the inspection service, to power generation and to the distribution infrastructure.
Innovation in the established energy industry is mainly connected with large companies
and organizations, relevant investments and long technology development and introduction
lead times. Tight deadlines, and the high-risk exposure created by the urgent need for
innovation, are inevitably going to impact the industry and its dynamics.
Significant funding of innovation by state projects in universities’ research institutes
will increase the pressure to innovate on research institutions and technology transfer in
years to come (Mowery et al. 2010). New technology transfer models between research and
industry must be developed (Masterplan Cleantech Switzerland 2010) in order to screen,
review, evaluate and manage the market introduction of breakthrough innovation, both in
quantity and quality. Incremental technology development can be managed with the
existing, continuous innovation processes already established in the industry. For break-
through innovation and future technologies, new models have to be developed or the field
could be left open to new entrants.
As far as an established company is concerned, innovation is usually developed by
internal research and development (R&D) or externally through alliances, merger and
acquisitions (M&A) or else by R&D co-operations with research partners within an
innovation and value network (Morandi 2011). In order to control the financial risks
involved in the developmental phase of innovation, internal R&D capabilities—whether of
industrial firms’ processes or organizations—are tailored to existing products and markets
(Ahuja and Lampert 2001). In addition, a number of control systems, processes and
responsibilities are established to manage R&D investments, with the high expectations of
quality and risk management involved during introduction to the market. Organizations
which are thus optimized to internal efficiency are no longer flexible and cannot easily
respond or adapt to new technologies and innovations (Christensen 2003): their absorption
capability for external innovation is challenged. This dilemma of successful coexistence
between breakthrough and incremental innovation has been investigated and discussed in
the Theory of Ambidexterity (Duncan 1976).
Such a situation requires new ideas in technology screening and transfer, which can be
complemented with the R&D venture concept introduced in this paper. Therefore the
research question discussed follows—do R&D Ventures, defined as an R&D cooperation
venture between incumbent firms R&D organization, academia and venture management,
improve the technology transfer for breakthrough innovation to future technology markets?
Section 2 will give a brief overview about existing literature and theory background and
Sect. 3 will describe the methodology. In Sects. 4 and 5 the case study and the findings will
be discussed. Section 6 will suggest a generalized framework for R&D Venturing and
propositions for its implementation.
2 Theories and background
Technology performance over time can be illustrated in Fig. 1 by the technology lifecycle
with an S-curve behavior (Foster 1987; Christensen 2003). To begin with it shows only
slow improvement, owing to the unknown fundamentals often accompanied by the need
for sustained scientific research. Typically the curve accelerates as insight increases,
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engineering activities, and controlled scaling lead to higher technology maturity. Then, as
the technology improves and a certain level of maturity is attained, the curve flattens out
asymptotically. A natural limit has been reached. In times of sustainable innovation, this
incremental behavior can be controlled by an established firm’s relationship with its
academic partners (Christensen 2003). In turbulent times, with considerable innovation
activity within an industry, disruptive or breakthrough innovation may occur quickly in an
irregular step function.
In the power industry, a time of turbulent innovation, with many competing renewable
technologies jostling for position, is a real challenge to large enterprises (Schilling and
Esmundo 2009; Mowery et al. 2010). Firms in this industry actively have to influence the
S-curve performance by increasing their technology and environmental scanning behavior.
Well-established nuclear, gas or coal technologies suddenly have to compete on a broader
scale with wind, solar, hydropower or plant efficiency improvement technologies. As
radical innovations are likely, and entrepreneurs capitalize on environmental change, an
increase of entrepreneurial intensity is vital (Barringer and Bluedorn 1999, pp. 423–425).
This is particularly true for large incumbent firms; these dynamics are further influenced by
a whole range of environmental, economic, social, political, and institutional forces. A
relative preference change—for example, one triggered by climate change, the high price
of oil or a nuclear catastrophe, can have considerable impact on such a technological
transition trajectory (Tripsas 2007).
The conventional view, supported by the theory of inertia, is that large incumbent firms
struggle in an environment of rapid change and rarely introduce breakthrough technology
innovation (Tornatzky and Fleischer 1990). A firmly specified ability to perform and
realistic expectations about new technology and its adoption are crucial to surviving the
race to innovate. Firms are likely either to ignore innovation trends or jump on them when
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it is already too late. But the fear of cannibalizing or jeopardizing existing business stems
from a failure to understand the pace of market evolution. Underestimating lifecycle
development means firms take uninformed decisions, and avoid taking risks or only take
them reluctantly, failing to seize the advantage by making the first move (Suarez and
Lanzolla 2007, pp. 379–383). Internal filters often screen out information considered
irrelevant to the organization’s main tasks and routines (Katz and Allen 1982; Kathoefer
and Leker 2010). This can be seen, for example, within existing R&D departments: geared
towards developing current technology and increasing its efficiency, they are often adverse
to risk and respond inadequately to breakthrough innovation (Henderson 1993; Kanter
1985; Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Adams 2005).
However, large firms also have real opportunities to develop and introduce break-
through innovation. Financial and technical capabilities are crucial, including access to
internal and external funds, bank credibility, a strong brand, economics of scale, tech-
nology spillover (Liang and Zhang 2011), sizeable R&D and scientific departments, and
facilities profitable enough not to be vulnerable, should development project fail. The
practical implications on management to react to breakthrough innovation are manifold.
These range from visionary leadership, availability for ‘‘patient money’’, planning flexi-
bility, greater involvement, and the participation of wider management functions (Kanter
1985) to increase absorption capability, expand cooperation within a value network (Miotti
and Sachwald 2003; Belderbos et al. 2004; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a, b; Bojanowski
et al. 2011; Christensen 2003) or develop a timely entry strategy (Suarez and Lanzolla
2007).
Figure 2 structures the technology transfer models for large corporations and introduces
R&D Ventures. A firm’s ability to learn and absorb for external innovation is strongly
influenced by the R&D organization and the relevant knowledge it has already built up.
R&D plays a leading role in exploring and assimilating innovation towards new product
launch (Audretsch et al. 2002, p. 157; Cohen and Levinthal 1989). It has been shown that
cooperation between large, permanent R&D organizations and public research institutions
at the front-line of technology results in higher absorption potential, positively influencing
a firm’s propensity to cooperate (Miotti and Sachwald 2003). It has also been shown
(Chandy and Tellis 2000) that over recent decades large incumbent firms have accounted
for just as many breakthrough innovations as new entrants (Sood and Tellis 2005, p. 163).
Mutual barriers which can disturb the partnership between industry and academia are:
disagreement about sponsoring R&D activities and intellectual property (IP) ownership
(Sohn and Lee 2011); publication needs versus academia’s lack of exclusivity; and a lack
of business understanding versus a lack of academic incentives (Hall et al. 2001;
O’Gorman et al. 2008). Public–private partnerships can also improve cooperation and joint
research owing to industry’s interest in having preferential access to talent and incentives
for academia (Adams 2005; Siegel et al. 2004; Siegel and Wessner 2010). In addition, it
has been shown that cooperation between academia and industry partners improves pro-
ductivity and patenting activity (Woerter 2011): cooperation affords industry partners
access to key faculty personnel and to students as potential future employees (Audretsch
et al. 2002, p. 181).
Small and medium innovators like scientific start-ups and spin offs are considered
straightforward successful when it comes to breakthrough innovation but the potential
obstacles are obvious (Christensen 2003; Andersson and Lo¨o¨f 2011). Agility, speed,
closeness to science, niche development, and the ability to focus solely on the imple-
mentation of successful breakthrough innovation—these can counteract the vulnerability
caused by economic and market barriers. It has been shown that start-ups require two to
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three times longer to validate technologies for their market than most founders expect—
indeed, the premature scaling of technologies is the prime reason for start-ups to perform
worse (Marmer et al. 2011). To overcome these deficiencies it has been suggested to ‘‘use
research spillover from more resource-rich firms and actively partner with organizations
with technology capabilities and financial resources they do not have themselves’’ (Chandy
and Tellis 2000, cited p.13). Large incumbents R&D organizations have these capabilities
and could be appropriate for such an active partnering approach. Although academic spin-
offs are considered important for the technology transfer invented by academics, most
academic patents are still used and exploited commercially by large firms (Meyer 2006).
Investigation into the contribution of university research to academic start-up firms shows
that the impact on their growth is higher when firms are able to detect, absorb and use the
knowledge owned by academia (Colombo et al. 2010, p. 118).
The phenomenon of contradictive attributes for breakthrough innovation in large
incumbent firms is also discussed in the theory of ambidexterity (Duncan 1976). Having the
ability simultaneously to exploit existing technologies and explore new ones is vital for their
long-term existence (Levinthal and March 1993). A hybrid theory in the domain of internal
and external corporate venturing has been developed (Michl et al. 2010) to improve inno-
vation and absorption capability by taking advantage of firms’ knowledge spillover for
innovative ventures (Festel 2009; Festel and Boutellier 2009). In an open innovation
approach (Chesbrough 2006) strategic spin-offs are introduced and discussed in the tele-
communication industry as a successful channel to incentivize internal R&D inventors to
spin out, in order to gain economic value from their research (Ferrary 2008, p. 606).
Many firms have established corporate venturing funds in order to explore new tech-
nologies and invest in rich technology sectors, and it has been claimed that a marginal
benefit relative to internal R&D can be achieved (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a). The role
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of internal R&D in corporate venturing is seen in ‘‘the leverage to gauge a venture
technology feasibility and consult corporate executives to determine business and market
risks’’ (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b, citation p. 618). Corporate venturing seeks inno-
vation and growth, diversification, new technology and new markets, but its impact on the
absorption capability of a firm remains uncertain (Hussinger 2010).
Corporate M&A activities focus on larger acquisitions in new markets or innovations in
the scaling phase and their business integration. The discovery phase of breakthrough
technologies seems not appropriate for M&A, as technology and product demonstration as
well as scalability has not been proven by scientific start-ups. Also researchers tend to be
‘‘innovation oriented, often lacking of goal orientation’’ (Wright et al. 2007, p. 143;
Bonardo et al. 2010) have shown that M&A has significant exit relevance for scientific
start-ups, often after IPO.
Based on the theories described above, and recognizing the private and social value of
wealth creation in large firms, the need to improve the ambiguity of large incumbents and
breakthrough innovations is evident. The R&D Ventures approach should enable large
R&D organizations to also focus on discovery of breakthrough innovation in an entre-
preneurial environment. Leveraging R&D acumen, technology overview, industrialization
and field test capability as well as R&D funds, large R&D organization can develop
breakthrough innovation with agile R&D Ventures towards technology demonstration
phase. The R&D Venturing approach will propose merging the attributes of small firms
and large incumbents through R&D cooperation and developing the concept of improved
technology transfer.
3 Methodology
The research presented here involves the case studies of three R&D Ventures in the power
industry, as well as their industrial and academic partners. The cases have been selected
because of the authors’ awareness, involvement and therefore access to detailed and
comprehensive information over a longer-term time frame. All selected cases represent a
special alliance type between one industry partner and different R&D Ventures, where the
industry partner does not have similar control and influence on the alliance partner. The
industry partner’s impact is represented by the timing and amount of equity taken. Names
have been changed to protect the companies’ identities. The research encompasses a multi-
year time frame which starts in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century and
is ongoing. The data was obtained from notes taken during numerous interviews and
workshops involving all relevant management positions, and also from internal and
external information, such as details about the founding of the company and the make-up
of the board, and R&D reports and documentation. The case study method was selected as
the R&D Venturing phenomenon was considered new—or anyway not yet well estab-
lished—and because case studies allow detailed investigation and understanding of a
management problem (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
This paper focuses more on understanding problems and building theory than on the
testing or validation of hypotheses, which is more the realm of quantitative research (Yin
2009). Research questions were defined and became the information filter by which to
qualify propositions. The successful implementation of the industrial partners’ R&D
Ventures, and the authors’ unique insights into the cases, were essential in order to
complete the research during the given time frame.
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The authors were present at—and sometimes also involved in—the development of the
R&D Venture network, and had access to all relevant management positions. This kind of
action research (Greenwood and Levin 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2005) obviously has a
bias, but the authors’ input was kept to a minimum: they were only engaged with the
research work itself, the particular focus being on studying the player involved in the R&D
Venture Network. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the phrasing of propositions
for further, more detailed research. The research may therefore be seen as a report from the
front line of innovation, while the paper can be considered a mid-term, qualitative report
into a wider, on-going research program involving other participants in the research area.
Discussions into the proposed suggestions have begun with other major industry players
who are interested in participating in the research program.
4 Initial situation and R&D Ventures set up
The following pages will discuss the initial situation of the industrial partners and aca-
demia, and the start-up of the R&D Ventures as a technology transfer model.
4.1 Industry partner
Power plants are high-investment goods with a lifetime of between thirty and fifty years.
With the liberalization of the power markets, service and maintenance of power plants
have become extremely important for utilities, as they have started increasingly to focus on
cost-effectiveness. Speed of maintenance, and the availability and reliability of an aging
infrastructure, are key to insuring an economic and reliable power supply. Inspection
technologies also play a major role in enabling a business where critical installations are
heavy, hard to reach, and vital to run the plant safely. In addition, the few inspection
personnel are demographically poorly distributed.
The rise of robotics, and the breakthrough innovation of using miniature cameras as
advanced automated inspection technologies, innovative cleaning devices, non-destructive
testing applications, system and software integration, and the possibility of robust,
industrialized application—all these were inspired by the overall improvement in tech-
nology maturity achieved by industries like telecommunications and electronics. The
integration and miniaturization of software and hardware—for example, in handhelds,
microcomputers or medical devices—also achieved an extraordinary degree of robustness
and were therefore promising concepts for the development of a wider development
program of industrial inspection robotics.
The industry partner1 in this research, an established player in the power industry, is
committed in the long term to further research, and has increased his environmental
screening activity. An investigation study showed that no serious external suppliers for
inspection robotics were available so R&D management decided to start an innovation
program in that field. The industry partner was reliant on a large, well-established inter-
national product-line organization with product management, an R&D program and exe-
cution capabilities, organized in critical technologies and encompassing about 2,000
employees. Following the companies strategy an R&D Program has been broken down,
which is executed with internal or external R&D resources. Internal R&D execution was
1 Alstom Power.
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only considered attractive if the technology was unavailable externally or was core and
therefore could not be shared.
In order to achieve a transparent R&D capability map, around 80 critical technologies in
the execution organization were described by a vision and mission statement. A critical
technology of inspection technologies was only established later on, during the research
time frame of the present study. However, inspection technology R&D demands capa-
bilities and processes, such as software development or mechatronics, which were not
available within the company. Nor was it believed that externally acquired experts would
be able to integrate easily into the company’s R&D environment. An external R&D
Service supplier, consultants, and in-licensing options were all considered. But again, it
would have been difficult to build the appropriate internal environment for R&D and the
subsequent production resources. The company’s R&D management had also previously
experienced difficulties, and were therefore wary of developing and trying to industrialize
technologies where internal absorption capabilities were very limited The most favorable
way of organizing the project was therefore to use an R&D Venturing approach in an
economical R&D environment, to test technology and achieve the demonstration stage
within an R&D cooperation.
4.2 Academia
The study also included an assessment of the technology partners in academia. Leading
global technology and academic partners in robotics, sensors and water-jet technologies,
ETHZ,2 EPFL3 and FHNW,4 were found in the near vicinity of the relevant R&D orga-
nization and contacted. A co-operation was the obvious step, although the industry partner
had only very limited in-house R&D experience or available resources which would be
needed to take on the development challenge. Knowing their R&D absorption capabilities
were limited, the industry partner was not willing to take the risk of building up the
appropriate R&D organization internally. On the other hand, they did not consider the
academic partner capable of advancing the development of the technology to more than
laboratory demonstrators.
The industry partner began several technical studies with post-graduate students sup-
ported by scientific academics which demonstrated and supported the maturity of the
different technologies. In order to find a sufficiently agile vehicle to ensure a fast indus-
trialization of robotic technologies and produce a prototype, an R&D Venture between
industry and academia was planned. The venture was to focus solely on product devel-
opment towards the demonstrator stage; it was to be funded like an internal R&D project
and eventually supported by external R&D funding.
In addition, a business case was developed with the academic partner’s technology
transfer office, R&D management, and the industry partner’s M&A organization, to give
the venture a perspective for a future in the robotics industry. R&D management’s
intention was to restrict the R&D Venture and to avoid going to market with immature
products. When interviewed, M&A and R&D management confirmed that neither orga-
nization was ready. The academic partner was not used to entering joint ventures, while the
industry partner was not prepared to handle the small size of such a transaction with its
non-adapted internal founding mechanism, due diligence decision criteria, documentation
2 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zuerich (ETHZ).
3 Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´ral de Lausanne (EPFL).
4 University of Applied Science North Western Switzerland (FHNW).
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and management awareness. If the R&D venture was going to happen, absolute commit-
ment of both the management teams involved was essential.
At first, all the R&D Ventures relied on the intellectual property of the academic
partners. However, there was no discussion about licensing fees, as the academic partners
would be directly benefiting as shareholders. Further benefits to the academic partners
included attracting academic talents to move into high-tech firms in the vicinity and scope
of their research; strong research cooperation externally funded by the R&D Ventures and
industry partners; and the anticipated innovation feedback.
Figure 3 summarizes the R&D Ventures set up in a table.
4.3 Alpha an R&D Venture in the inspection service industry
Alpha Joint Venture was founded in 2006 as an R&D Venture in the inspection robotics
industry between an established power generation service company as the industrial partner,
and an academic partner. Alpha was established to pick up the latest breakthrough tech-
nologies in the academic sphere and find the fastest way of reaching the demonstrator phase.
It was stipulated in the shareholder agreement that Alpha was not allowed to market any
products for the first two years of its existence. Only R&D efforts funded by the industrial
partner and heading towards industrial product proof would be accepted. For two years Alpha
was therefore a pure R&D company, without any focus on supply chain or market devel-
opment. However, a six-year business case was developed between the start-up and the
industrial partner, showing the path of the post-development phase, which led towards the
successful leverage of the developed inspection products into adjacent non-power markets.
The industry and academic partners and Alpha management are all shareholders of the
joint venture. The industry partner owns a majority (51%) but the academic partner (24%)
and Alpha management (25%) also own a significant number of shares, making a strong
impact on the start-up’s development and decisions. Alpha is located in the local science
park so as to allow a close operation between academia and industry. It was decided that IP
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Fig. 3 Table comparison of the investigated R&D Ventures
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would be with the industrial partner, while a royalty-free, unlimited license guarantees
Alpha’s long-term existence. The shareholder agreement restricts Alpha in a non-compete
clause to not enter the power market without the industry partner. However Alpha‘s very
aggressive business plan for the non-power market determines its financial success. The
interaction between Alpha and the industry partner’s R&D, engineering, and special field
service organizations was set up to ensure that stability and field experience of products
was of prime importance.
4.4 Beta an R&D Venture in the manufacturing industry
Beta is active in the manufacturing industry as a leading water jet cutting and cleaning
product and service provider. It was founded as a cooperation in 2007 between an academic
partner—FHNW and a small and medium enterprise in the regional manufacturing industry.
The academic partner had achieved a state-of-the-art position in the development of water jet
technologies, the application of which in the power industry significantly reduces the speed
of overhaul and maintenance, and increases efficiency after plants have been recommis-
sioned. Beta’s founding as an R&D Service provider was supported by the same industrial
partner which had founded Alpha; however, this time, the industrial partner did not start the
company up as a shareholder but requested specific R&D services in water jet technology.
Like Alpha, Beta is located in a local science park and works in close cooperation with
academic institution. In 2008 the industrial partner bought a minority share of 30% from
the management of Beta and the SME partner, thus turning Beta into an R&D Venture with
the task of developing industrial water jet demonstrators and products. Beta was free to
start marketing and sales activities in 2010 although three years of pure R&D were needed
until the first products could be demonstrated. Beta shares infrastructure with its academic
partner and works in an innovation network with Alpha to develop automated cleaning
applications for inspection robotics in the power market.
4.5 Gamma an R&D Venture in the sensor industry
Founded in 2009, Gamma is owned by academic founders who wanted to build a market
position in the sensor market for non-destructive testing, an important technological devel-
opment in the inspection industry of power plants. Although Gamma works in the same
innovation network as Alpha, Beta and the industrial partner’s R&D, it is an independent
company. Gamma is currently developing new technologies in the miniaturization of sensor
products, which will reduce the weight but improve the application and technology perfor-
mance of robotic products. In recent years, the company’s R&D has been actively working to
reach the product’s demonstration phase. As the industry partner owns the intellectual
property of the work done, as stipulated in the purchase order contracts, but cannot acquire the
know-how, negotiations were started to turn Gamma into an R&D Venture.
The risk involved in working in the breakthrough technology area with a small, non-
redundant start-up lies with the industry partner. In an R&D customer role, he invests in the
research and has to rely on a small, possibly unreliable enterprise, without being able to
acquire the know-how himself. Therefore, it is obvious that at some point, depending on
how risky the investment is, the industry partner might give up on the cooperation or else
show an interest in engaging further with the company, for example as an R&D Venture.
This way, he gets a second handle and can control the management of the start-up as a
shareholder and board member, thus securing his investments. The industry partner, on the
other hand, ensures the start-up management better access to his own R&D management,
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and achieves control over operational issues at a working level. In this way, the R&D
Venture is considered a mutual commitment for R&D cooperation between small, agile,
highly innovative companies and established, experienced enterprises.
4.6 R&D Ventures shareholder agreements and boards set-up
The shareholder agreement was set to describe the contractual basis of the joint research
venture and its board of directors. Share distribution of the R&D Ventures is clearly
defined in the shareholder agreement, and the EBIT5 factor of the annual due diligence will
be used to evaluate the actual value of the venture in the event of dilution of capital or trade
exit. Exit, preemption, refusal, stipulated damages and liquidation conditions and their
impact on shareholders are also carefully defined. In addition, a non-compete agreement,
licensing of intellectual property, the use of brands, and external communication are all
defined to protect individual parties and describe a cooperative approach to market.
All the boards have meanwhile experienced changes in their skill set and capabilities.
From the outset, it was the intention to connect external SME representatives to the board of
the R&D Ventures in order to tap into small entrepreneurs’ experience. For Alpha this was
implemented by the employment of a local representative, while in Beta the representative
was a shareholder from the founding team. Alpha experienced a couple of natural fluctuations
in the set-up of the board, which affected the president, the academic representative, and legal
and R&D representatives. However, new skills were selected carefully and commonly
chosen. These new capabilities have enriched the working structure and have not jeopardized
the performance of the board or the management and operation of the R&D Venture.
5 Practice experience and findings
5.1 R&D Venture network set up
The first, externally hired R&D responsible for the industry partner was tasked with setting
up the innovation program for the advanced inspection technologies, defining the size, scope
and timeline. Clearly defined by the industry partner’s R&D management and reporting
directly to them, his task was to set up a network, rather than an internal R&D organization.
Experience A: Dedicated R&D resource
Dedicated R&D responsible on industrial side …
Reporting directly to R&D Management
Task to control of innovation speed and build up of the R&D Venture network
Access to the relevant internal industrial resources
Talents focus on R&D and commonly recruited with academia
Defining clear product specification including external R&D funding propositions
In the planning and foundation phases, Alpha was not represented by management; the
partners themselves started a hiring initiative to find a chief technical officer (CTO) and
R&D staff, which were all discovered in the vicinity and network of the academic partners.
The CEO joined Alpha one year after it was founded so that there was sufficient time to
develop production and marketing strategy and organize the eventual go to market.
5 EBIT Earnings before Interest and Taxes.
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As the real impact of water jet technology was unclear at the outset, the industry partner
initiated the foundation of Beta separately, without becoming a shareholder. Hiring activity
focused on R&D personnel educated by the academic partners, every R&D Venture starting
with a clear R&D specification and product target definition. The product development
quality process was carried out by the industry partner, who also funded and reviewed
activities. Externally funded R&D programs were successfully launched with the academic
partners in all areas of development, made easier by the fact that academia, industry and the
young technology start-up were involved in an eye-level R&D cooperation.
Experience B: Technology acceptance
Technology acceptance and the absorption capability of the industry partner increases by …
Build up of internal R&D resources
Interaction between the R&D Ventures and industry experts
Knowledge Sharing and acceptance of interdependence
Tailored processes towards speed and agility
Figure 4 shows the development of the R&D Venture Network head count to date. The
initial focus of ramping up the program was on the innovation network within the R&D
Venture. Then, after two or three years, the ramp-up also began within the industrial
partner’s R&D organization, because the steering of the R&D program had reached a size
which made it impossible for one person to manage, both in terms of capacity and
experience. To keep up with the speed of innovation and guarantee a controlled and secure
ramp-up, the industrial partner decided to build up its expertise, focusing exclusively on
inspection technology rather than on robotics, water jet cleaning or sensor technologies.
These are to date the R&D venture’s area of competence, and interdependence is vital to
maintain speed and agility. The critical technology of the inspection technologies was then
introduced to the industrial partner’s R&D execution organization.
All network partners share knowledge, and interviews have shown that this exchange of
R&D experience, product strategy and product development with the industrial partners
was absolutely crucial for the innovation speed the network achieved. The strong inter-
action with experts from the industrial partner—in all areas, but particularly within power
plant field service and engineering—was of great importance for the R&D Venture to
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deliver the expected technology and product applications. In return, feedback from those
organizations was very positive, emphasizing in particular the visible performance and
delivery of the R&D Venture Network. Internal processes, workflows and tools were
selected and tailored to create and maintain an agile, straightforward environment.
Experience C: Administration and licensing
Administrative hurdles …
Jeopardizing the venture development speed
Immediate intervention of the R&D Management to resolve issues
Licenses scheme allow all partners to secure their interests in…
Intellectual property for technology and products
Unlimited royalty free license agreement
Builds common trust in the network
Large organizations have a strong tendency to regulate and control. In the joint venture
situation Alpha management found it difficult to keep the pace of speed of a small start-up.
In a joint venture situation with the majority share held by the industrial partner, Alpha
experienced some conflict. This ultimately jeopardized the speed of innovation, particu-
larly in financial consolidation and human resources management, which overloaded their
administrative and management resources. These issues could only be solved by the
eventual intervention of Alpha’s board, with the industry partner’s representatives from
R&D and business development clarifying the situation with the internal industrial partners
organization. The overall focus agreed by all stakeholders was on agility and a speedy
attainment of the product demonstration phase. Thus, a special, less administrative treat-
ment of Alpha as regards financial consolidation and human resources management could
successfully be achieved.
5.2 Product industrialisation
Success of economic enterprises would be measured in financial results, whereas for early
stage breakthrough innovation, development of technologies thoroughly protected with IP
is key. Figure 5 shows innovation activity, measuring the annual number of patent priority
filings between 2006 and today. As defined in the shareholding agreement with Alpha, all
patent applications were filed with the industrial partner’s IP organization, with the R&D
Venture receiving in return a royalty-free, unlimited license. The ramp-up of intellectual
property came from the network; however, as it was difficult to identify invention own-
ership, a certain number of patents was also filed by the industrial partner’s own internal
R&D organization. Nevertheless, all patents were licensed reciprocally between Alpha and
the industrial partner.
Experience D: Innovation drop
Innovation drop because of product industrialization…
Avoid effort underestimation in business plan by cooperation; academia/industry
Control of R&D resources head count
Careful build up of R&D Venture engineering resources and organization
Support in field and prototype test from the industry partner accelerates
Avoid premature product entry into scaling phase
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Of special interest is the drop in innovation in recent years, apparent in the patent
application graph above. In order to back up the finding, Fig. 5b shows the number of
technologies developed by the network from 2006 to date. Based on literature (Tornatzky
and Fleischer 1990, p.20) a ‘‘Technology’’ has been defined as a technology which has
successfully achieved the demonstrator phase in one product application. Technologies as
defined build a technology platform out of which a number of products can be developed.
For an inspection robotic example which follows a modular technology concept, one
inspection robotic product will consist of a number of technologies, for example multi-
motor control, drive module, parallel kinematics, line following, high-adhesion module or
climbing wheel, which build the basis for further product developments.
The annual distribution of technologies successfully developed supports the findings
shown in the patent distribution, and an innovation drop can be assumed. The reason for
this was discovered in the workload distribution within the network. Figure 6 shows the
head count development in detail for Alpha and Beta in Full Time Equivalents (FTE). Both
tables reveal the effects of industrialization and the build-up of engineering work forces
within the R&D Ventures. After a two to three years sheer R&D phase of the main
technologies product demonstration could be presented and first applications were tested in
the field. Particular in the power industry where technologies have to be applied in a harsh
and rough environment the industrialization However the industrialization towards a robust
product or system application, which can be marketed and produced in a appropriate size,
needs a shift in resources from R&D to engineering and product application, supply chain,
marketing and product service work forces. All the players involved in the development of
the original business case for the R&D Ventures had underestimated the industrialization
phase in terms of time and the demand on resources. Once the ventures realized that their
R&D organization was unable to fulfill their industrialization demands, they suggested a
reorganization. As the business case of the R&D Ventures was restricting the growth in
resources, internal R&D personnel moved over to the engineering organization, which had
by then been proposed and built. Also the first exchange of resources between Alpha and
the industrial partner took place during this phase. Because of the restriction, the industrial
partner saw the need for a longer timeline, however his internal R&D demands were
consistently being met and first other external customer had been successfully approached.
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Figure 7 shows the overall qualitative development of the R&D Venture Network from
2005 to date. All data is validated with numbers. This represents the real behavior of the
development and consistently supports what has been discussed above.
Starting with a straightforward R&D workload increase, the network’s technology
delivery also increased as forecast. As planned, system sales within the network were
delivered with a reasonable time gap. The quality of the estimated budgets was also
satisfactory until the effects of the underestimated engineering workload were felt: with the
extra engineering effort required, the drop in both technology delivery and network system
sales was felt, due to restricted workforce capacity and the attempt to keep to estimated
business plans.
It should be noted that for breakthrough innovations these restrictions could not be
compensated simply by increasing the budget or resources—for example, by using
Fig. 6 Alpha and beta detailed head count development between 2006/2007 and 2011
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corporate venture capitalists, as it would have increased risk. In the early stage of tech-
nology development, dependence on single resources and their capability is high and
limiting the speed of innovation. In an established firm, these restrictions could have been
eliminated and the head count bumped up; however, costs and the risk of the project’s
failing would also have increased. Smaller stand-alone start-ups might not have been able
to survive this planning gap. In case of Alpha, an about three year period of technology
development has been followed by an about two year industrialization phase. Without the
industrial partners interest and long-term, ‘‘patient’’ R&D investment in the technology
outcome, his ability to support industrialization e.g. with power plant field-test capability
and engineering know how, this phase could have been longer.
In interviews, the R&D management considered this innovation drop an often under-
estimated time effort after the validation phase, in which product performance is increased
and flaws cleaned up in order to start an efficient scaling phase. This phase is usually cost
intensive and crucial to control the risks of bringing the product to market and avoid
premature scaling. Experienced organizations’ experience of product industrialization
helps control the risk, but for breakthrough technologies in the engineering organization,
this does not exist and costs can spiral uncontrollably. For R&D Ventures the cost structure
is transparent and limited by the business case. The delay depends on the availability of a
small number of highly educated staff resources, which cannot quickly be increased. Time
to market suffers but comparatively costs can be kept under control. The scaling starts only
after technology industrialization. Premature scaling is a common reason for the failure of
standalone start-ups, because they cannot to bear the costs of a normal short-term business
plan and are tempted to jump into the scaling phase too early.
Experience E: Market approach
Successful market approach depends on…
Business Case with a wide technology and product application range
Thoroughly industrialized products
Professional behavior of the R&D Ventures backed up & educated by the industry partner
Market credibility of the R&D Venture increases with appropriate communication of the partnership e.g.
brand or shareholder ship and leverage of the know how learned into other industries
The initial business case for the R&D ventures was showing a strong technology and
product opportunity in adjacent non power markets, which were allowing the R&D ven-
tures to leverage the lessons learned after delivering industrialized products for the power
market. This is a key decision criteria when going for R&D Ventures.
Using the industrial partner’s brand, show-cases and experience, Alpha successfully
acquired an order backlog of relevant product revenues in the Oil & Gas, Marine and Food
Industries. By this time, Beta and Gamma had also become active in the non-network
market in the automotive and jet engine industries. Customer interviews confirm a highly
professional approach to market of the network’s R&D Ventures. The technologies have so
far been received with interest—confirmed by the number of orders—and the products
released seem robust. This can be explained, that all technologies are tested with the
industry partner user and industrialized carefully in the power market. But also the
exposure of the R&D Ventures to a professional environment was educational from the
beginning. For example the R&D Venture employees were participating in the standard
industry partners education programs like an environment, health and safety course for
onsite power plant activities and were continuously interacting with experienced power
plant field service staff on site or with professional power market management and sales
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personnel. R&D Venture management’s response to the innovation drop shown above was
to reorganize and build up the engineering and marketing departments and secure a second
release of new R&D programs with the academic and industry partners. This further built
up the technology platform and developed new product applications.
The R&D Venture network achieved significant improvements in the power service
inspection business. Quite a number of new inspection technologies have been introduced
to the market improving the efficiency of the components, e.g. an 1-2% efficiency increase
of a turbo compressor after introducing new cleaning and overhaul technologies could be
achieved. With the introduction of new automation robotics the inspection service per-
sonnel of power plants was less exposed to difficult EHS (environment, health and safety)
situations, the operation efficiency of scarce inspection personnel was improved and the
overhaul time of a plant inspection was reduced by faster access to the inspection target
areas, e.g. by avoiding scaffolding or extensive machine dismantling and parts transport off
site. The R&D Ventures managed the knowledge and capability leverage and applied these
technologies in energy transmission and distribution networks, renewable energy, hydro
and other energy storage sites and even to railway inspections. Their market success in the
oil and petro-chemistry industry was by showing that replacing complex life time
inspections with difficult EHS exposure like radiography for certain high investment plant
components could be achieved and reliability and availability improved.
The rise of external system sales after a market evaluation time were showing a global
demand for the products and with establishing reliant customer relation, particular with the
acquisition of multiyear contracts and additional staffing, the confidence in products and its
delivery has taken up again. All R&D Ventures discussed above are entering their targeted
markets with leading edge technology still ahead and superior to competition.
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Figure 8 summarizes the conditions set and the characteristics of R&D Ventures as
experienced by the partners involved. In the R&D phase, the R&D Venture owns the
know-how, which is adopted by the industry partner. The environment is defined by the
speed of innovation and by technology acumen. With product industrialization, a highly
synergetic phase sets in where the industry partner supports the R&D Venture with a wide
range of industrialization know-how, engineering interaction and field-testing. Finally, in
the scaling phase, the R&D venture builds production, marketing and sales acumen from
the product launch with the industry partner, which it can then leverage for customers from
adjacent markets.
5.3 Comparison with internal R&D Projects
Experience F: Internal versus external R&D projects
R&D Ventures are competitive or even better compared with internal industrial R&D projects because…
Entrepreneurial R&D Venture environment close to academia
Clear target performance
Fast Innovation pace and efficient IP protection due to entrepreneurial product approach
Committed management incentivized on cost, staffing and time schedule
Control of cost and speed in the premature demonstration phase is critical
In order to demonstrate the innovation ramp-up of the R&D Ventures’ innovation
network Fig. 9a, b shows a comparison of the industry partners’ previous experience of
running internal R&D projects of comparable size and technology life cycle with similar
international patent classification. Neither of the projects selected were within the core
competence of the R&D organization but were highly innovative. The projects were
executed in the same entrepreneurial and R&D culture of the industry partner and have a
similar technology life cycle, which allows a comparison and discussion.
The reconditioning project (Project I) was set up internally to develop the latest laser
and scanning technology for the reconditioning of service parts. The internal monitoring
project (Project II) was initiated to develop breakthrough monitoring and diagnosis systems
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for the service business, but due to internal reorganization it had been faded out of the
research frame. Both R&D projects deal with complex technical systems, are of a similar
size to the R&D Venture network, and deliver, or delivered, breakthrough innovation for
the organization. However, it can be seen that the speed of innovation for the R&D
Ventures was nearly doubled. The five- to six-year time frame was considered sufficient to
ramp up the breakthrough technologies, since all R&D Ventures and projects had reached a
natural first innovation limit.
Interviews with R&D management and Patent Management confirmed that the ramp-up
by the R&D Ventures was received extremely quickly whereas the pattern of innovation in
internal R&D projects was just a normal part of their activities. The Patent Officer stated:
‘‘I can see no reason, why the internal projects are less innovative. All patents claims also
of the R&D Ventures, are screened and evaluated by the patent board and need to achieve
a degree of innovation to allow the cost of filing. Even if we are chasing the internal R&D
organization we sometimes do not get sufficient early protection, patenting is often con-
ceived additional work even if it is remunerated’’. Furthermore the Alpha CEO can be
cited: ‘‘We have aggressively patented in order to protect our products using the Industry
Partners IP validation Process’’. This states that the R&D Ventures because of the
entrepreneurial situation are far more aggressive in protecting intellectual property than the
internal R&D teams, which are only remunerated.
A strong, internal focus, with far less emphasis on academic input, capabilities and
cooperation, as well as education time, the positioning of activities within the company,
poorly adapted review processes and the ability of reviewers—all these prevented a fast
ramp-up, explaining the cost differences shown. External sales of the R&D investments for
the R&D Venture network were not taken into account, although during years four and five
significant revenue was achieved, approaching the same range as the R&D investments.
The proven success factor for the R&D Ventures was an entrepreneurial R&D environ-
ment, defined by clear target performance and a management committed and incentivized
on cost, staffing and time schedule. The control of cost and speed in the very early
demonstration phase is critical. Small, agile entities with the appropriate management
attendance have an obvious competitive advantage, when R&D experience and resources
are provided in a cooperation.
In interviews the R&D Management emphasized on the experienced similarities
between R&D Ventures and internal R&D programs: ‘‘The approach seems faster and cost
effective, however the technology and product issues experienced are similar to our daily
R&D live and are well known for an experienced R&D Manager’’.
6 Framework and propositions for R&D Ventures
6.1 Conceptual framework for R&D Ventures
Classifications of R&D Ventures into common technology transfer channels are shown in
Fig. 10. A generic technology maturity S-curve development over time has been underlaid
with a qualitative technology development process. The phases describing the S-curve are
derived and adapted from a wealth of literature (Marmer et al. 2011). It starts with the
discovery phase, often in close cooperation with science and academia, where the inno-
vation partner scouts for, screens and identificates potential innovation opportunities. In the
validation phase, the innovation assessment and incubation of the technology are critical,
where the potential value of the innovation is estimated and first business cases are
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evaluated (Galbraith et al. 2006). The efficiency phase targets the refinement of the product
in the demonstration and test phases in order to prepare a risk-mitigated scaling of the
technology. The scaling phase starts to accelerate the production, industrialization, supply
chain and marketing of the new technology launch. Every phase has a specific and
important task to fulfill; the underlying processes rely on R&D experience and must be
controlled with milestones and a defined scope of what is to be achieved. A badly managed
process will usually be repaid with a high-risk exposure, often with product failure or the
costs resulting from poor-quality, after-market introduction. (Marmer et al. 2011). All the
R&D Ventures discussed above have achieved the efficiency phase or more, in a variety of
technologies.
When it comes to innovations which sustain and expand the existing technology
portfolio, the corporate research organization is able to take them over directly from
scientific and academic partners. It then pushes them along the established value chain, its
prior experience and knowledge giving it confidence in its decision (Miotti and Sachwald
2003). Innovation partners, academia and industry are all used to this process (Morandi
2011); the interfaces are clearly defined in R&D purchase orders and contracts, and the
technology transfer is defined and takes place at the interface (Adams 2005).
As far as future technologies are concerned, there is a lack of capability for corporate
research; in addition, the academic partner can only proceed as far as technology evalu-
ation. Industrial R&D experts are less confident and the trust they give internally is limited,
owing to their lack of prior experience in the technology. The risks of innovation are
considered high, supported by Siegel et al. (2003). Literature has shown that expert
technology assessors and reviewers rate a ‘‘lengthy proposal, summary of the firm, team
members, target market and technology’’ relatively low when they are predicting tech-
nology success (Galbraith et al. 2006, cited p. 681). The gap cannot easily be bridged by
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either of the partners, nor by corporate venturing or M&A alone, as these can evaluate and
invest but not deliver R&D experience into the development phase with the necessary solid
research and development capabilities (Andersson and Lo¨o¨f 2011).
The experience practice discussed in Experience A ‘‘Dedicated R&D Resources’’ and B
‘‘Technology Acceptance’’, supports that R&D Ventures are an option to professionally try
and test the technology in an incubation phase fast towards demonstrator (Di Guardo and
Harrigan 2011), before committing on a business plan based on a technology assessment
described above by Galbraith et al. (2006).
Particular in the validation phase corporate research can induce the assessment and
incubation by initiating an R&D venture with academic partners, when the future tech-
nology development would be within a reasonable time frame, given by the organizations
standard R&D innovation cycles. After incubation, and moving towards the feasibility and
demonstration phase, corporate venturing or the industrial partner’s M&A can take over to
pursue engagement. In the scaling phase, the R&D Venture may be acquired by the
industrial partner, or sold back to management or to external investors, or it may be closed.
These are decisions strongly influenced by the board of the R&D Venture. Research has
shown that the composition of the board typically changes over the lifetime of the venture.
Strongly impacted at first by the founding team and its technology capabilities, it separates
into management team and board. The board takes on the advisory role and new members
with market skills and supply chain expertise or corporate ventures will naturally occur
during the course of development (Colombo et al. 2009). In a case study it has been shown
that the process of forming a board is influenced by the board members’ social network
(Bjørnali and Gulbrandsen 2010). If there is an attempt to positively diffuse the venture
technologies, the authors favor the involvement of corporate venturing suggested by Siegel
et al. (2004). There is evidence that the acquisition of small, high-tech start-ups by large
incumbent firms produces dismal results, as often the original inventors leave the company
after acquisition (Colombo et al. 2009, p. 8). In any positive exit case, with the dilution of
shareholders, the founding management must have an attractive ensured benefit, which
should be properly defined in the shareholder agreement.
The exit phase has not been reached with any of the R&D Ventures discussed, allowing
room for further research. However, the board formation, and the changes discussed above,
were in line with the behavior predicted by research.
6.2 Propositions for R&D Ventures
The following set of proposition derived from the previous are discussed as following.
Proposition a For industries with strong external innovation pressure, R&D Ventures
are a fast track to demonstrator stage and access to a future technology portfolio.
Where an industry has become stagnant, and a high level of growth in the established
market is lacking, or if it is facing strong external innovation activities and demands like in
the energy sector, the search and adoption of innovations are crucial for the established
market player. (Schilling and Esmundo 2009; Mowery et al. 2010). As new innovation and
market entrants like with new inspection technology but also with wind or solar tech-
nologies may challenge established positions, the discovery and pursuit of new opportu-
nities, both internally and externally, is vital. (Barringer and Bluedorn 1999). The degree of
the absorption level and the flexibility of the organization is critical for successful posi-
tioning. M&A activities and corporate venturing allow the recognition and capturing of
innovations and technologies which have achieved demonstration and are already visible in
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the market. (Bonardo et al. 2010). However, the number of transactions is limited because
of size and risk exposure. Overpriced transactions, the possible discovery of ‘‘what has
really been acquired,’’ and integration issues all jeopardize the economic benefits.
Internal R&D organizations can only explore the incremental expansion potential of
the existing technology frame. (Henderson 1993; Ahuja and Lampert 2001). Experience F
‘‘Internal versus external R&D projects’’ has shown an advantage of R&D Ventures
against internal R&D projects and that speed and agility to achieve demonstration of a
new innovation opportunity in a future technology is important to reduce risk exposure
and failure. Large industry inertia (Tornatzky and Fleischer 1990) can be compensated by
an appropriate R&D Venture set-up demonstrated by practice Experience A ‘‘Dedicated
R&D resources’’, C ‘‘Administration and Licensing’’. R&D Ventures are an external
opportunity for established industry to discover, develop and adopt innovation at an early,
pre-demonstration stage; when it is accepted internally, and properly interacts with the
R&D organization, the absorption capability of an organization can be increased (Miotti
and Sachwald 2003). Experiences B ‘‘Technology Acceptance’’ shows that interaction
between the R&D Venture and the industry increases acceptance and adoption of the
breakthrough technology. R&D Ventures are therefore applied when the technology does
not expand the existing technology frame of a corporation but shows potential to fit into
its future technology portfolio, within a reasonably short time. Industry should not found
R&D Ventures right at the beginning, but when the risk of working with independent
start-ups as breakthrough innovation partners is too high, and a further control mechanism
is needed, R&D Venturing is a promising option.
Proposition b For breakthrough innovation R&D Ventures are an opportunity for R&D
cooperation with technology transfer between academia and industry.
In the early stages of technology innovation, academia can assume a sufficient overview
of global publications in an innovation area, and is connected to relevant scientific players.
A restricted ability to assess technology or to develop beyond science and education limit
the success rate in technology transfer, although established industry partners may improve
the evaluation process with technology and product development, production and market
know-how. (Hall et al. 2001; O’Gorman et al. 2008). Therefore, cooperation between
leading-edge technology know-how and product and market acumen is essential to suc-
cessfully capture and explore early-stage future technologies. Technology identification,
assessment and potential can be improved by a cooperative technology transfer approach
between academia and industry partners.
Audretsch et al. (2002) and Siegel et al. (2004) have shown that cooperation between
academia and industry partner improves productivity and patenting activity, whereas main
interest for industry partner to cooperate is in access to key faculty personnel and students
as potential employees. Experience A ‘‘Dedicated R&D resources’’ and C ‘‘Administration
and Licensing’’ show that access to talents and a trust building IP scheme are also success
factors for the R&D Venture approach. R&D Ventures are set up as agile, entrepreneurial
vehicles to increase performance of R&D cooperation for both technology transfer
partners.
Proposition c R&D Ventures are an opportunity for young and talented entrepreneurs to
start up technology ventures with increased speed in R&D cooperation with established
industry and academia.
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Literature shows that entrepreneurs from academia often start up technology ventures at
an early stage of technology maturity (Marmer et al. 2011), where the time to demonstrator
stage and the target definition of the demonstrator remain unclear. The economical risk
remains with the entrepreneurs. The practice Experience D ‘‘Innovation Drop’’ shows that
shared product target definition and product development experience from established
industry partners reduce the time and resources required. The growth impact on academic
start-up firms is high when firms are able to detect, absorb and use the knowledge from
academia (Colombo et al. 2010). Entrepreneurs benefit from fast, focused adoption of
professional product development know-how, immediate product development target
setting, reduction and sharing of development risks, access to academic talents and con-
trolled resources ramp-up, as well as technology know-how and industrial experience. The
R&D Venture has direct access to the industrial partner if industrialization problems arise,
and can directly involve the industrial knowledge sources via their connection to R&D
management. Literature revealed the hurdles for independent scientific start-ups to
approach the market (Marmer et al. 2011; Chandy and Tellis 2000). Experience E ‘‘Market
Approach’’ shows the advantages for R&D Ventures leveraging their alliance situation
when approaching customers. This advantage particularly becomes vital for difficult
markets with strong entry barriers like in the energy example, where already customer
plant access can be a difficult barrier to overcome.
The R&D Venture management benefits both from the development of the company,
and if a dilution of capital trend sets in during the scaling phase, so that major investments
have to be taken and original shareholders are washed out or turn into management
positions. A clear evaluation of the company’s value and its shares is essential to attract
future talent, and has to be defined at the founding stage of the R&D Venture.
7 Discussions and conclusion for future research
R&D Venturing has been introduced and discussed as a practical phenomenon in the
energy industry. It has been applied to improve the technology transfer for breakthrough
innovation and future technologies and is focused on the early stages of technology dis-
covery and evaluation towards demonstrator stage. It has been shown, that a R&D
cooperation with large industrial R&D organization and small agile ventures in the energy
market with long product lead times can be successful. The authors argue that R&D
Venturing is a practical approach for the energy industry, particular because of its long
development lead times with significant technology introduction risks. The R&D Ventures
build an entrepreneurial joint development vehicle, which allows exploring new technol-
ogies effectively and exploiting synergies in technology know how and market experience
efficiently. With the characteristics shown in the case study presented agility and speed to
technology demonstration and therefore the risk exposure of the partners will be reduced
significantly. However interdependence, know-how exchange and thorough implementa-
tion of cooperation drivers are vital for the R&D venture concept regardless of the
industry.
However the question if the conclusions above also hold true for other than the energy
industry is essential. Recognizing the conceptual framework and propositions discussed in
Fig. 10 as a valid opportunity to develop future breakthrough technologies with the R&D
Venture approach and realizing irregular dynamics of disruptive technology lifecycles in
an industry, the need to identify a risk mitigating approach to demonstrate breakthrough
technology is obvious. The authors would argue that the conclusions for the R&D Ventures
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approach and its application are relevant when an industry faces irregular disruptive
technology lifecycle dynamics with many potential breakthrough innovations coming up;
too many to be explored within the enterprise internal R&D resources focused on
improving existing technologies and where speed to radical technology demonstration is
crucial and a competitive advantage for the different players.
The R&D Ventures discussed above have shown an improvement in performance and
investment when compared with similar internal R&D projects for future technologies. The
ramp-up of intellectual property and innovative technologies in the cases discussed has
been faster and more cost efficient. The pace of delivery of new technologies to industrial
partners and to market is advantageous. In an interview, R&D Management compared
R&D Venturing as follows: ‘‘When a big army crosses a plain, it has an overview of the
situation and moves as one, but when it enters a hilly landscape, it is wise to have small,
fast search parties assessing the situation. That is R&D Venturing.’’ Agility and speed are
crucial. The leverage of R&D investments and technologies developed into adjacent
industries appears successful and the benefits are important. The ownership and share
distribution between academia, venture management and industry has significant impli-
cations on R&D Venture performance. A joint venture such as Alpha, with a majority share
in the industrial partner, has advantages, like usage of brand and financial support, but also
limits, including jeopardizing speed to demonstration, venture integration and financial
consolidation. R&D Ventures with a minority share, like Beta and Gamma, show a similar
performance and are equally successful. A critical phase for R&D Ventures is the
assessment of the technology and the time frame needed to achieve demonstrator stage.
This assessment drives the R&D cost ramp-up and the payback expectations. Failure or
misjudgment will jeopardize the success of the innovation activity. An integrative tech-
nology assessment and development with the partners is vital for success: only if the
venture is given the chance to position itself efficiently in the center between academia and
industry will it benefit from latest technology know-how and industry experience. In this
matter, the R&D Venture board plays an important role in helping the positioning between
the players who align, control and guide the R&D Venture and its development partners.
Industry partners have to be aware of this role; relevant managers have to be convinced
about the R&D Venture approach and represented in positions of control. The speed of
development is set by a clear target, which has been agreed in a commonly developed
business case, an initial product strategy, and a strong integration of the R&D Venture with
academic and industrial partners. Public funding can be involved into the R&D efforts
without difficulty, as the eye-level cooperation between the partners is supportive for an
SME environment and the future technology aspects of the set-up are immanent.
7.1 Implication for research and practice
This paper is based on case studies in the energy sector and conclusions must be drawn
with care: generalizations drawn from what may be unique patterns can be misleading, and
should be accompanied by knowledge of the cases discussed. However, the conceptual
frameworks allow for deeper understanding of the principles of R&D cooperation with
R&D Venturing, leverage the conclusions into other industries and may help to further
conduct empirical research investigation. Research into the area of R&D Ventures will in
any event be further conducted in coming years by the authors and the research team. The
authors main focus of future R&D Venturing research will be on the technology evaluation
mechanism in the energy sector; the performance comparison of R&D Ventures with
standalone start-ups; the future set-up of technology organization; the management of a
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portfolio of R&D Ventures and the incubation mechanism to share knowledge in an
innovation and entrepreneurs’ laboratory positioned between academia and industry.
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